A computational framework that can account for object categorization and identification has gained empirical support from recent studies of monkey behavior and neurophysiology.
Including all chairs in one category requires ignoring many differences between them, whereas identifying unique chairs requires attending to those very differences. Indeed, some argue [7] that these problems are so different that the left hemisphere is specialized for making generalizations, as in categorization, whereas the right hemisphere is specialized for making fine distinctions, as in identification. There are, however, computational approaches that can account for both categorization and identification within the same system. This is perhaps best illustrated in one exemplar-based model of categorization and identification, the generalized context model [8] .
According to this model, categorization and identification are based on similarity to memories for previously encountered exemplars. Evidence for a particular categorization is based on the summed similarity to category exemplars, whereas evidence for a particular identification is based on the similarity to a specific exemplar; a categorization or identification decision is based on the relative evidence across alternatives. Exemplars are represented as points in a multidimensional psychological space, where dimensions are qualities such as color, shape, spatial frequency content and the like. Similarity between a stimulus and an exemplar is an exponentially decreasing function distance in that space.
One central aspect of the generalized context model is that dimensions are attended according to their diagnosticity for categorization (or identification). This selective attention process acts to stretch (or shrink) the multidimensional space so that some dimensions become more (or less) important than others in determining similarity between items (Figure 1 ). This assumption of dimension-selective attention is critical for the generalized context model accounting for both categorization and identification [8-10] -stimulus identification typically requires attention to multiple dimensions, whereas many categorization problems may require attention to a limited number of diagnostic dimensions.
The generalized context model has accounted for a variety of fundamental findings in categorization, identification, and other domains. The basic model has been extended by incorporating connectionist learning mechanisms [11] , stochastic elements necessary for time-course predictions [12, 13] , and additional attentional elements for stimulus and response selection [14] . Until recently, however, tests of the generalized context model and related models have been confined to human behavior.
Sigala et al. [3] have now shown that the generalized context model can account for categorization by both humans and monkeys. They found that the generalized context model accounts much better for the available data than a number of competing models, including those based on prototype abstraction or conditional probabilities. Monkey and human observers learned to classify exemplars of faces or fish varying along four dimensions, for example, in the case of faces: eye separation, eye height, nose length and mouth height. Only two of the dimensions, eye separation and eye height, were diagnostic, in that both had to be attended for perfect categorization; the other two dimensions were irrelevant. During categorization, monkeys and humans placed more weight on diagnostic dimensions than non-diagnostic dimensions in computing similarities. Furthermore, monkeys and humans showed increased perceptual sensitivity along diagnostic dimensions when making similarity judgments after categorization experience. Essentially, observers attended to dimensions that were diagnostic for categorization -ignoring non-diagnostic dimensions -even outside of the context of the categorization task.
Neurons in the occipito-temporal visual pathway, particularly within the inferior temporal cortex in the monkey, can develop selectivity for objects after categorization experience, appearing to represent those objects in a low-dimensional psychological space [15] . What remains unclear, however, is whether all dimensions of an object are equally represented by inferior temporal cells, or whether task relevance influences selectivity to particular dimensions. In the work of Sigala et al. [3] , all feature values along all dimensions were presented with equal frequency: this could presumably lead to equivalent representations of diagnostic and non-diagnostic dimensions, as frequency can be an important determinant of visual responses [16] .
In a companion paper, Sigala and Logothetis [4] recorded from inferior temporal neurons of monkeys while they categorized faces or fish learned in the behavioral study [3] . The authors did not focus on cells highly selective for one category, such as 'face cells' or 'fish cells'. Indeed, some of the cells apparently discriminated within both face and fish dimensions (see also [15] ). After recording the activity of all visually responsive cells, Sigala and Logothetis [4] found that a large proportion showed selectivity along at least one stimulus dimension. For example, one cell might respond more to wide eyes than close eyes and another cell (quite possibly the same cell) might respond more to a round fish tail than a curved fish tail. Strikingly, although neural responses were not specifically responsive to faces versus fish, neurons showing dimensional selectivity were limited to those coding for dimensions that were diagnostic for categorization (but see [15] ). These findings [4] thus demonstrate a tight relationship between categorization behavior and the distributed information represented in the responses of inferior temporal cells in the occipito-temporal visual pathway. The computations described by the generalized context model framework could be supported by such as network.
What still remains rather unclear is how best to characterize the difference in firing rate for diagnostic versus non-diagnostic dimensions. The generalized context model has typically characterized 'attentional weighting' of diagnostic dimensions as a flexible process, with dimension weights shifting in an optimal fashion depending on task demands [10] . In addition to such an adaptive process, dimensional weighting could also reflect a form of perceptual learning in which diagnostic dimensions become perceptually more discriminable, perhaps because of enhanced receptive field properties or an increased number of neurons coding a dimension. Finally, this weighting could also reflect perceptual learning of another kind: the creation of entirely new dimensions within the visual system [17] . In the case of the fish stimuli, presumably novel to the monkeys, it is not unreasonable to imagine that new feature dimensions for the shape of the dorsal fin, ventral fin and so forth may have been 'created' during the categorization task. Unfortunately, Sigala and Logothetis [4] did not report recordings of inferior temporal cell activity before and after categorization, so the true nature of this dimensional attending remains unclear.
It also seems important to measure neural activity in different kinds of task that do not emphasize the same diagnostic features. Is the dimensional selectivity expressed in the activity of single neurons 'hard-coded' from perceptual learning, or is it 'softcoded' in the service of a particular categorization task? In humans, expertise identifying objects from a category, birds or cars for example, leads to changes 
